2025 PCRLJ 135

Order

       Raza Ali Khan, J.---Titled appeal stems from the judgment of the High Court dated 27.09.2023, whereby, the appeal filed by the State has been dismissed.

2.    The appellant herein contested the judgment rendered by the District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge Anti-Narcotics Court Muzaffarabad on 25.03.2019 by lodging an appeal before the High Court, whereby, the trial court had acquitted the accused-respondent No. 1 in a case involving offences delineated under Sections 32 and 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (CNSA). The High Court, through its impugned judgment dated 27.09.2023, dismissed the appeal on the grounds of non-maintainability, as it was filed beyond the statutory period of limitation prescribed under Section 48(1) of CNSA.

3.    Raja Mazhar Waheed Khan, the learned Additional Advocate-General, after presenting the necessary facts, argued that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is founded on a misconception of both; law and the facts, rendering it unsustainable. He contended that the High Court erroneously dismissed the State's appeal on the grounds of limitation. According to the learned Additional Advocate-General, under the provisions of CNSA, there is no fixed period for filing appeals against acquittal orders. However, Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908, provides a six-month period for filing such appeals, therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant in the High Court was well within the prescribed period of limitation. Furthermore, the learned Additional Advocate-General criticized the acquittal order passed by the trial court, asserting that the accused-respondent is unequivocally linked with the offence and that the prosecution substantiated its case by presenting reliable and compelling evidence. He submitted that under these circumstances, the accused-respondent should be held accountable and punished for the offence, as his guilt was conclusively established.

4.    We have heard the learned Additional Advocate-General and reviewed the available record. The sole issue upon which the learned High Court based its impugned judgment is the limitation for filing an appeal against the acquittal order. The High Court dismissed the appeal, stating it was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and was therefore incompetent. However, an identical matter recently came before this Court in the case The State v. Khalid Hussain Rathore¹, wherein, this Court authoritatively addressed this specific point, observing thereof that for an appeal on behalf of the State, the correct legal position is that the limitation period for filing an appeal under section 417(1) Cr.P.C is six months, as prescribed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908. For better appreciation, the relevant portion of the aforementioned judgment is reproduced below:

       "8. The second objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents concerns the limitation of the appeal filed before the High Court. It was argued that the appeal, filed on 30.01.2013, exceeded the prescribed limitation period of 30 days for appealing against an acquittal order passed by the trial Court. In support of this contention, reference was made to the precedent set forth in Rustam Khan's case, (supra) wherein it was established that section 417(2-A) Cr.P.C imposes a 30-day limitation for filing appeals against acquittal orders. For clarity, the relevant portion of the judgment (supra) is reproduced below:

       "While meeting the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in Appeal No.27 of 2016 that limitation provided under section 417 (2-A), Cr.P.C., is not applicable in the appeal against the acquittal order passed under section 265-K, Cr.P.C., it may be observed here that only section 417 (2-A), Cr,P.C., provides limitation for filing appeal against acquittal order of any Court other than High Court, which is 30 days. It does not make any difference that the person is acquitted of the charge without recording evidence under, section 265-K, Cr.P.C., or after recording evidence under section 245, Cr.P.C. In each case, section 417 (2-A), Cr.P.C., provides limitation for filing appeal against the acquittal order which is 30 days."

       9. In the aforementioned case, this Court observed that only section 417(2-A) Cr.P.C imposes a 30-day limitation for filing appeals against acquittal orders passed by any Court other than the High Court. It is irrelevant whether the acquittal occurs without evidence being recorded under section 256-K or after evidence recorded under section 245 Cr.P.C; in both scenarios, section 417(2-A) mandates a 30-day limitation period for filing an appeal against the acquittal order. The interpretation adopted in That judgment seems to have been misunderstood. For a clearer understanding of the proposition, Section 417 Cr.P.C, is reproduced hereunder: -

       "417. Appeal in case of acquittal. (1) Subject to the provision of subsection (4), the Provincial Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court.

       (2)        If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.

       2-A) A person aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court, may, within thirty days, file an appeal against such order.]

       (3)        No application under subsection (2) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order.

       (4) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (2) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, on appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under subsection (1).]"

       10. Upon a comprehensive review of the above-mentioned legal provisions concerning the right to appeal against an acquittal order, it is evident that this right delineated into three distinct categories for the purpose of limitation. Firstly, pursuant to subsection (1) of Section 417, of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the authority to direct the public prosecutor to pursue such legal recourse before the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal rests exclusively with the State for which no specific period of limitation is stipulated under section 417 Cr.P.C. Secondly, under subsection (2), in cases where an acquittal order is issued in response to a complaint, the option of filing an appeal against such order in the form of special leave to appeal is conferred solely upon the complainant, who must avail this remedy within sixty days from the date of the acquittal order, as stipulated in subsection (3). Lastly, with the addition of subsection (2A) to section 417 Cr.P.C, the right to appeal against an acquittal order, whether original or appellate, is extended to a person aggrieved by such order, who may exercise this remedy within thirty days. It is evident from the foregoing analysis, that the specified limitation periods of sixty days and thirty days respectively apply only to those criminal acquittal appears filed by the "complainant" or "person aggrieved" respectively. However, no specific limitation period is prescribed under the amended provision regarding appeals against acquittal under subsection (1) of section 417 Cr.P.C thereby leaving it regulated by Article o 157 of the Limitation Act, as reproduced under: -

       11. In the light of the well-established principle of statutory interpretation that where the plain and simple meaning of a provision of law is clear and unambiguous, nothing should be presumed or inferred from external sources, it follows that all the appeals against acquittal covered by subsection (1) of section 417 Cr.P.C will continue to be governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act. This legal position regarding the limitation period remains unchanged even after the addition of subsection (2A) to section 417 Cr.P.C, which grants the right to appeal within thirty days to an aggrieved person. Similarly, subsection (2) read in conjunction with subsection (3) of section 417 of the Cr.P.C, which pertains to acquittal appeals in complaint cases, confers the right of appeal solely to the complainant' within sixty days, subject to the condition of obtaining special leave' for this purpose. However, regarding the appeal on behalf of the State, the correct legal position is that the limitation period for filing an appeal under section 417(1) Cr.P.C is six months, as prescribed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It may be observed here that the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1908 in the proceedings conducted under Criminal Procedure Code had been a debate since decades. There had been a divergent opinion regarding the applicability of the Limitation Act in the proceedings conducted in Cr.P.C. Reference can be made to the case reported as Mohammad Ibrahim v. Goppi Lal², it has been held that bar is absolute and Limitation Act does not apply, however, in the case reported as AIR 1957 (Madras) 300, AIR 1975 (Andra Pardesh) 406, AIR 1958 (Andra Pardesh) 230 and AIR 1957 (Allahbad) 500, it has been eloquently enunciated by the Courts that Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 is a general law and provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable in the proceedings. Subsequently, it has been a consistent view of the superior Court that the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable in the proceedings regulated in Cr.P.C. In the present case, the appeal against acquittal on behalf of the State was filed within six-months. period from the date of the acquittal order rendered by the trial Court, thus it was filed within time."

5.    The learned High Court might not have been aware of this Court's judgment at the time of drafting the impugned judgment, however, it was incumbent upon the learned counsel for the appellant to present the relevant judgment to the High Court to avoid unnecessary litigation. In light of these circumstances, without addressing to the merits of the case, the appeal is accepted. The impugned judgment is set aside, and the case is remanded to the High Court for decision on the merits.